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I.  INTRODUCTION
Arguments  in  legal history  often  serve  as  "stand  ins"  for  more
general controversies  in legal and political theory. One of the most
dramatic  examples of this phenomenon is the question of what ac-
tually was the  character  of American  constitutional jurisprudence
in the late nineteenth  and early twentieth  century-the  period  of
the so-called  Lochner Court.'
As  I study the constitutional  history  of this  period, I have  in-
creasingly  come  to believe  that to a surprising  extent, the picture
we have of the Court between 1880 and  1937 is largely the product
of winner's history  My own  view is that the Supreme Court main-
tained  an astonishingly  constant  underlying vision  during its first
150 years. The first sharp break, I would submit, occurs  only after
1937
As  you  all will recognize,  no dogma  is more widely  accepted  in
American constitutional  history than the proposition that the late-
nineteenth-century  Supreme Court brought about the first radical
reversal of American  constitutional  premises.s  As an  aside, let me
point out that when the constitutional history of an earlier genera-
tion was written  as a  clash between  nationalizing Federalists  and
states rights  Antifederalists,  the  difference  between  the Marshall
*  Charles  Warren  Professor of American  Legal  History, Harvard Law  School. B.A.,  City
College  of New York,  1959;  Ph.D., Harvard  University, 1964; L.L.B., Harvard Law School,
1967.
1.  L. TRIBE,  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  §  8-2,  at 434-36  (1978).
2.  See generally S.  FINE,  LAISSEZ  FAIRE  AND  THE  GENERAL-WELFARE  STATE:  A  STUDY  OF
CONFLICT  IN  AMERICAN  THOUGHT,  1865-1901  (1956);  C.  JACOBS,  LAW  WRITERS  AND  THE
COURTS  85-93  (1954);  A.  PAUL,  CONSERVATIVE  CRISIS  AND  THE  RULE  OF  LAW:  ATTITUDES  OF
BAR AND  BENCH  1887-1895,  at 209-21  (1960)  (discussing several  Supreme  Court decisions in
the 1890s that evidence  a move toward judicial activism, particularly  cases overturning the
Income  Tax Act  of 1894);  B. Twiss,  LAWYERS  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION:  How  LAISSEZ  FAIRE
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and Taney  Courts  was often represented  as  more  sharply  discon-
tinuous  than  anyone would  concede  to be true today.'
Early in the twentieth  century, when the progressives  perceived
industrial  society  as  increasing  in inequality and oppression,  they
became convinced that a redistributionist state was both necessary
and  just.  Simultaneously,  they  sought  to  delegitimate  the  an-
tiredistributionist  picture of the neutral state,4  which had become
a  widely  shared  constitutional  ideal.  The  Income  Tax  Case  of
1895,5 though  framed in  more technical  constitutional terms,  was
the  ultimate  expression  of the  view that  any  progressive-hence
redistributive-income  tax was  illegitimate.'  That view,  I  believe,
had  deep  roots  in early American  constitutional  history.
As  I  hope to show,  the  neutral-state  ideal  can  be  traced  from
early American political and constitutional thought to its applica-
tion in the current  debate  over  characterizing  American  constitu-
tional thought as republican  or liberal.7 One  of the ways to under-
stand  the  debate  between  republicanism  and  liberalism  in  early
American  constitutional  history  requires  a  consideration  of
whether  and  when the  idea  of a  neutral, night-watchman  liberal
state triumphed  in American political  thought.
3.  See 2 C. WARREN,  THE SUPREME  COURT  IN  UNITED  STATES  HISTORY  278-320  (1922).
4.  Benedict,  Laissez-Faire  and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of
Laissez-Faire  Constitutionalism, 3  LAW  & HIST.  REV.  293 (1985).
5.  Pollack  v. Farmer's  Loan & Trust, 157  U.S. 429  (1895).
6.  See also A.  PAUL,  supra note  2, at 198-208  (discussing Pollack).
7.  See generally B.  BAILYN,  THE  IDEOLOGICAL  ORIGINS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION
(1967);  J.  DIGGINS,  THE LOST  SOUL  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS: VIRTUE,  SELF-INTEREST  AND  THE
FOUNDATIONS  OF  LIBERALISM  (1986);  J.G.A.  POCOCK, THE  MACHIAVELLIAN  MOMENT  FLOREN-
TINE  POLITICAL  THOUGHT  AND  THE  ATLANTIC  REPUBLICAN  TRADITION  (1975);  G.  WOOD,  THE
CREATION  OF THE AMERICAN  REPUBLIC  1776-1787  (1969); Appleby, Republicanism in Old  and
New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY  Q. 20 (1986);  Banning, Jeffersonian  Ideology Revisited: Lib-
eral and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43  WM. & MARY  Q.  3  (1986); Ross,
The Liberal Tradition  Revisited and the Republican Tradition  Addressed, in NEW  DIREC-
TIONS  IN  AMERICAN  INTELLECTUAL  HISTORY  116  (1979);  Shalhope, Republicanism and Early
American Historiography,  39 WM.  & MARY  Q. 334  (1982).
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II.  LEGITIMATION  OF  THE  NEW  DEAL  BY  DELEGITIMATION  OF  THE
LOCHNER  COURT
A.  The Rise and Fall of the Neutral State
Progressive historiography  often represented the rise of substan-
tive due process  as a radical break in constitutional jurisprudence.
In  retrospect,  this  course  of events  seems  similar  to  what  John
Marshall was doing under the contracts clause8  and what the ante-
bellum  state  courts  were  deciding  under  takings  clauses9  rather
than some sharp discontinuity in constitutional ideology. The crea-
tion of antiredistributive  constitutional  checks  on  legislatures  has
always  taken  many-splendored  paths  in  American  constitutional
law.
So why, if I am correct, was the so-called Lochner Court misrep-
resented  as a unique era in American  constitutional history? Why,
moreover,  does Lochner continue  to stand  as  a symbol  of every-
thing that is to be avoided  in. constitutional  adjudication?
A  detailed defense  of my  view of the Lochner Court 'would take
too much time. Suffice it to say that McCurdy's  important work on
Justice  Field10  and  Jones'  excellent  reconsideration  of  Thomas
Cooley"  point in this same direction. An earlier generation saw the
post-bellum  rise  of laissez-faire  as  a Lochnerian  wish to let a free
market trump protective governmental  regulation. Revisionists  see
instead  a continuation  of the  Jacksonian  wish  for a  neutral state
that  would  prevent  "the  interests"  from  using  government  to
feather their own nests. Justices  Cooley  and Miller expressed their
Jacksonian  roots, for  example,  in the municipal bond  cases. 2  The
8.  See U.S. CONST. art. I,  §  10.
9.  See Bloodgood  v. Mohawk & H. R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837); Beckman v. Saratoga &
S. R.R.,  3 Paige Ch.  45, 57  (N.Y. 1831); Gardner v. Village  of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch.  162,
168  (N.Y.  1816);  Raleigh &  G. R.R.  v. Davis,  19  N.C.  (2  Dev. & Bat.)  431,  439-41  (1837);
Harvey v. Thomas,  10 Watts  63,  66-67  (Pa. 1840).
10.  McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence  of Government-Business  Relations:
Some Parameters  of Laissez-Faire  Constitutionalism,  1863-1897, 61 J. AM.  LEGAL  HIST. 970
(1975).
11.  Jones,  Thomas M.  Cooley and the Michigan Supreme Court: 1865-1885, 10  J.  Am.
LEGAL  HisT. 97  (1966).
12.  See  6 C. FAIRMAN,  HISTORY  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  918-1116
(1971).
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justices felt that the railroads used the anti-laissez-faire  position to
get a larger  share  of the pie.'"
The  late-nineteenth-century  insistence  on  a  neutral  state  that
was  predominantly  antiredistributionist  arose  simultaneously  out
of  both  conservative  and  progressive  concerns.  Conservatives
feared  that  the  state  might  be  used  to  bring  about  levelling,
whereas  progressives  feared  that the  state  was  becoming  the  in-
strument not only of the wealthy and the powerful, but of corrupt
city political  machines.
The rise  of the regulatory welfare  state in the twentieth century
represented a fundamental  assault  on this  liberal  conception  of a
neutral  state  that  had  emerged  out  of the  American  Revolution
and  had  been  developed  and  elaborated  over  the  course  of  the
nineteenth  century.  The  current  discussions  regarding  liberalism
and republicanism  in early  American  thought  serve  a larger  pur-
pose.  They enable  us to recognize that the  creation of the ideal  of
neutrality was not limited  to America,  but rather  was part  of the
nineteenth-century  liberalism  throughout the Western  World.
In Europe, as Schumpeter demonstrated so brilliantly in his His-
tory of Economic Analysis,14 the challenge  to liberalism's  assump-
tions  of neutrality  also  focused  on  questions  of  economic  policy.
Among those  challenges  were the  Progressive  Income  Tax  in the
English  Budget of  1911,  the  attack  on  the  the  Gold  Standard  as
preventing government regulation of the money supply, and the in-
troduction  of the  tariff as  a  challenge  to  free  trade  policy." 5  All
these challenged  policies identified neutrality with a "natural" self-
executing market economy.
As  is typical  of American  history, however,  the  central arena  of
controversy  in  this  country  over  the  liberal  idea  of  the  neutral
state  was constitutional  law. In the  United States, the progressive
historians  and  their New  Deal successors  challenged  the Lochner
Court's basic assumptions of neutrality. If we examine the develop-
ment of these arguments, we will see the moment when the mean-
ing of the Lochner era was  mystified  and misrepresented.
13.  Id.
14.  J. SCHUMPETER,  HISTORY  OF  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  (1954).
15.  See id. at 759-71.
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B.  Two  Lines of Delegitimating Strategy
The  progressives  formulated  roughly  two  lines  of  attack,  or
delegitimating strategies.  In the first, they argued that democracy
required judicial restraint. Starting from Thayer's famous  1893 es-
say, 16  the progressives  developed  the view that not only was judi-
cial  review  undemocratic,  but  the  Lochner Court  had  departed
from  a supposedly  well-established  historical  baseline  of judicial
restraint. Thousands  of pages  were  written  to  demonstrate  that
under the  influence  of either natural  law  or mechanical  jurispru-
dence, the  Supreme  Court had  violated  precedent  and  converted
procedural due  process into substantive  due process, thereby  sub-
verting the  ideal of judicial restraint.
1 7
In  their  second  line  of  attack,  the  progressives  went  beyond
questions of institutional legitimacy to focus  on inquiries concern-
ing the substantive  premises that lay  behind the liberal idea of a
neutral  state.  How  could  the  free-market  conceptions  that made
freedom  of contract a constitutional  ideal be defended  in light  of
the vastly unequal market power  existing between unorganized la-
bor and corporate capital? How could there be freedom of contract
amid  the tremendous  corporate  concentration  taking place?  How
could  there  be  a coherent  distinction  between  the  state  and the
market,  or between  public and private realms,  when  cartelization
was  creating  private  economic  power  that  overshadowed  public
power?.How could there be a vital, effective, flourishing democracy
when prevailing  constitutional  doctrine supported and legitimated
a society growing  ever  more unequal  in wealth and power?'"
The first line of attack eventually prevailed. This challenge grad-
ually was drawn into the mainstream of constitutional discourse in
16.  See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional  Law,
7  HARV.  L. REV.  129  (1893).
17.  See  L. BOUDIN,  GOVERNMENT  BY  JUDICIARY  (1932);  E. CORWIN,  THE  "IGHER  LAW"
BACKGROUND  OF  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  (1928);  C. HAINES,  THE REVIVAL  OF,NATURAL
LAW  CONCEPTS  (1930);  B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN  INTERPRETATIONS  OF  NATURAL  LAW: A STUDY  IN
THE HISTORY  OF POLITICAL  THOUGHT  (1931); Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,  8 COLUM. L.
REV.  (1908);  Thayer, supra note  16.
18.  See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13  CORNELL  L.Q. 8 (1927);  Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercion State, 38 POL.  SCI. Q. 470  (1923); Pound, Lib-
erty of Contract, 18  YALE  L.J. 454  (1909).
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its 1950s legal-process/neutral-principles  mode.1 9  Even before that,
however, the assumption that the Lochner Court represented some
aberration that a more neutral  constitutional theory was supposed
to  address  and correct  became  a dogma of conventional  constitu-
tional  scholarship. 20  This  dogma  triumphed,  I  would  suggest,  be-
cause it  served originally  both the legitimating  and delegitimating
needs of those who wished  to bring about  a New Deal. In fact, the
New  Deal  produced  the  first  judicially  initiated  constitutional
revolution  in American history, if we exclude  the eventual  impact
of the  equally far-reaching  Civil  War Amendments.
C.  Justifying Change as a Return to a Golden Age
New Deal thinkers did not portray their revolution  as a justifia-
ble overthrow  of anachronistic nineteenth-century liberalism. They
opted  not  to  demonstrate  that  liberalism's  conception  of an  an-
tiredistributive state was incompatible with the moral and political
premises  of a  regulatory  welfare  state.  Instead,  New  Deal  propo-
nents explained their revolution opportunistically  as a healthy and
normal  corrective to a Lochner Court that had strayed from  a his-
torically  neutral baseline  of democracy  and judicial  restraint. For
the past  fifty years,  a symbiotic  relationship  has existed  between
constitutional  legitimation  of the  New  Deal and delegitimation  of
the Lochner Court.
At this  juncture,  one  should  wonder  why  New  Deal  constitu-
tional historians chose this particular  form  of delegitimating  argu-
ment. For example, why was it necessary to argue that the Lochner
Court  Justices  wrote  their  own  conceptions  of  the  Constitution
into the  law  any  more than  John  Marshall  or Joseph  Story  did?
Why did the argument emphasize  that the Lochner Court went off
the track, rather than that these were good reasons for a New Deal
departure  from well-established  constitutional byways?
Just asking the question  suggests the answer.  It  is more difficult
to justify a constitutional  revolution on substantive  than on proce-
dural grounds,  easier to claim that one is restoring the neutral and
19.  See H.  HART & A.  SACKS,  THE LEGAL  PROCESS:  BASIC  PROBLEMS  IN  THE  MAKING  AND
APPLICATION  OF  LAW  (1958);  Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles  of Constitutional  Law, 73
HARv.  L. REV.  1 (1959).
20.  See S.  FINE, supra note  2; B. TwIss, supra note  2; Pound, supra note  17.
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the natural according to some metahistorical  baseline of neutrality.
Wherever legitimacy is defined by law, there will be a clear advan-
tage to those who  argue for continuity  over  discontinuity, as  well
as for those who claim  to restore such continuity. It will be easier
for those who wish to change things to mystify-to themselves and
others-the  fact  that they  are  changing  things.  Justifying  great
changes as desirable  is not as easy as representing them as a return
to some earlier  Golden Age.
What is lost by such a form of justification, however, is any pow-
erful substantive vision of what made the  change seem  imperative
in the  first place.  We  have  gradually  lost touch  with the reasons
why the  idea  of  a neutral state  was  incoherent and depended  on
unsupportable  background  assumptions  about the relationship be-
tween state and society, public and private law, freedom  and coer-
cion, rights and duties.  Some of our most prominent legal thinkers
have  been  able to return  virtually unchallenged  to Lochner Court
assumptions2'  in part because for almost fifty  years constitutional
historians have taught that the dispute  concerned disembodied in-
stitutional ideas of legislative  power  and judicial restraint, not law
as the  embodiment  of substantive  visions of the good  society.2
III.  THE  REPUBLICANISM-LIBERALISM  DEBATE
One of the most promising bodies of recent historical scholarship
that offers us some real hope of illumination is the current debate
over  the  roles  of republicanism  and liberalism  in  early  American
political and constitutional thought. 23  Although a number of meth-
odological  and conceptual  problems  remain to be clarified,  I hope
that this debate  will spark a new age of reconsideration  of the en-
tire  body  of American  constitutional  history.  In  particular, I  be-
lieve  that  the  schism  between  the  liberal  ideal  of  the  neutral,
night-watchman  state  of  Madison's  tenth  Federalist24  and  the
ideas  of  neutrality  that  were  most  elaborately  expressed  in the
classical  legal thought of the Lochner era offers an important line
21.  See, e.g.,  R. POSNER, THE ECONoMIc  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW (2d ed.  1972); Easterbrook, The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV.  L. REV.  4  (1984).
22.  See J. ELY,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DISTRUSm  A  THEORY  OF  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  (1980).
23.  See supra note  7.
24.  THE FEDERALIST  No.  10, at 62  (J. Madison)  (Tudor Publ.  Co.  1937).
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of  development.  First, let  me state  what I  find  so  exciting  about
this  debate.  I will then try to explain  the reasons  why I feel that
the participants  all too frequently continue to talk past each other.
A.  A  Caveat
I am convinced that there was a republicanism-liberalism  schism
in early  American thought that probably  continues  along  some  of
its axes  up to the present day  Like all ideal types, however, these
categories need  to be dealt with very  carefully  Because  a number
of variables constitute  each of these categories, they will inevitably
combine and recombine over time. A great danger exists, therefore,
that  scholars  will  accord  more  weight  to  one  variable  than  they
should  in  interpreting  a period.
In  1720,  for  example,  attitudes  towards  commerce  or  property
may  be  fundamental  in  defining  the  republican-liberal  or  court-
party/country-party  dichotomy  These  particular  variables,  how-
ever,  may be relatively unimportant by 1800. If one of the decisive
questions  in  1787  is  whether  a  republican  government  can  exist
over a large territory, that question may have been insignificant  in
England twenty years  earlier  or in  America  twenty years later. In
1750,  one's conception  of law may be relatively unimportant in de-
fining the  essence  of republicanism.  In  1890  the  same  conception
may be at the  core of the tradition.
A similar caveat relates  to how we interpret  particular thinkers.
I have little doubt, for example,  that Madison's  tenth Federalist 25
is one of the central texts of an emergent  American liberalism. Al-
though  I associate  the  ideal type  of liberalism  with a  denial  of  a
substantive  conception  of the  public  interest,  I  am  equally  con-
vinced that Madison, and indeed any representative  of the Virginia
Enlightenment,  would  not  have  rejected  completely  such  a  sub-
stantive conception of the public interest. Like most of the revolu-
tionary  generation,  Madison  was  still  wavering  between  two
paradigms.
25.  THE  FEDERALIST  No.  10  (J. Madison) (Tudor Publ.  Co.  1937).
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B.  Defining the Issues
What issues are at stake in the republicanism-liberalism  debate?
The best way to approach this question is to  offer a brief and su-
perficial  intellectual history  of the problem.
Before  Bailyn,2 8  Pocock,27  and  Wood"  attempted to define  the
issues  of the  republicanism-liberalism  debate,  a body of work  on
Adam  Smith that can  be  traced  back  to  Polanyi2 9  and has  been
brought forward by Wills o had already addressed the question. In
my opinion, this body  of  scholarship  decisively  sets  Adam  Smith
apart  from  his  successors.  Unlike  that  of his  successors,  Adam
Smith's  philosophy  was  rooted  in  a  conception  of political  econ-
omy. The  starting point for this conception  was  not only  a labor
theory of value but, more importantly, a self-consciously normative
political culture that subordinated  economic to political ideas.
The  recent publication  of Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence 1
is an astonishing  confirmation of this view. First, the substance  of
these lectures demonstrates  that Smith is clearly in the line of the
great  republican  political  sociologists  from  Montesquieu  to  Toc-
queville.32 Even more importantly, Smith's lectures underline what
I would  call the  late-eighteenth-century  republican  theory  of law
as constitutive and creative  of political culture. Smith explains the
shift from  feudal  to liberal  ideas  of property  not as the result  of
economic  necessity,  but rather  as  the  self-conscious  use of law to
perfect  and  improve  society and human nature.33
One  issue in the republicanism-liberalism  debate  is the status of
positivism,  or  the separation  of  facts  and values.  Straussians had
been attacking both Marxism and liberal instrumentalism from the
right since the 1950s.34 Pocock's appeal to the tradition of civic vir-
26. See  B. BAILYN,  supra note  7.
27.  See J.G.A. POCOCK,  supra note 7.
28.  See G.  WOOD,  supra note  7.
29.  K. POLANYI,  THE  GREAT TRANSFORMATION  111-12  (1944).
30.  G.  WILLS,  INVENTING  AMERICA:  JEFFERSON'S  DECLARATION  OF  INDEPENDENCE  102-03,
129-30,  209,  231-32,  254,  289  (1978).
31.  A. SMITH,  LECTURES  ON  JURISPRUDENCE  (1978).
32.  See  1 R. ARON,  MAIN  CURRENTS  IN  SOCIOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  (1965);  Nedelsky,  Book
Review,  96  HARV.  L. REV.  340  (1982).
33.  See A. SMITH,  supra note  31.
34.  See L. STRAUSS,  NATURAL  RIGHT AND  HISTORY  (1953).
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tue seems to resonate with these antipositivist appeals to an  Aris-
totelean community.
Pocock elaborated  the republican  tradition  out of a similar  dis-
taste  for  the  forms  of  atomized  individualism  that had  come  to
dominate  liberalism. Above  all, however,  he seemed  to be  looking
back to Polanyi, who believed that orthodox Marxism, by reducing
politics  to superstructure,  had denuded an independent  vital form
of human fulfillment and development. 3 5
If I read him  correctly,  Bailyn's  work  is also  directed  primarily
against  Beardianism"6  in  American  history.  To  the  extent  that
Beard is a stand-in for Marx, Bailyn, like Pocock, focused his anal-
ysis on the reductionist base-superstructure methodology  of ortho-
dox  European  Marxism.37  By  emphasizing  ideological  origins,
Bailyn  was insisting  on the autonomy of ideas  and  cultural tradi-
tions. Like Pocock, Bailyn was pointing a way out of instrumental
social science's  mode  of class or interest group  explanations  of so-
cial change.
If Bailyn's work has a conservative spin because of his sense that
revolutionary ideology bore a distorted or pathological  relationship
to  reality," 8  Wood's  great  book"'  sought  to  relegitimate  the
Beardian  social-conflict  model  without returning  to its  simple  re-
ductionist premises.  Along with Pocock, Wood  was the first writer
actually to recognize that republicanism was a truly coherent polit-
ical  alternative to  liberalism  in American  thought."
At this  point,  we  can  begin  to  see  the  emergence  of the  basic
model. Liberalism  stood for a subjective theory of value, a concep-
tion  of  individual  self-interest  as  the  only  legitimate  animating
force in society. In addition, liberalism stood for a night-watchman
35.  Pocock,  Cambridge Paradigms  and Scottish Philosophers:  A  Study of the Relations
Between the  Civic Humanist and the Civil Jurisprudential  Interpretation  of Eighteenth
Century Social Thought, in  WEALTH  AND  VIRTUE:  THE  SHAPING  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY  IN
THE  SCOTTISH  ENLIGHTENMENT  235,  248-49  (1983).
36.  Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography,  63  OR. L. REv. 679 (1984)  (referring to the
model of social conflict among interest groups in, e.g.,  C. BEARD, AN  ECONOMIC  INTERPRETA-
TION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  (1935)).
37.  See  R.  HOFSTADTER,  THE  PROGRESSIVE  HISTORIANS:  TURNER,  BEARD,  PARRINGTON
(1968).
38.  See B.  BAILYN,  THE  ORDEAL  OF  THOMAS  HUTCHINSON  (1974).
39.  See G.  WOOD,  supra note 7.
40.  J.G.A.  PococK, supra note  7;  G. WOOD,  supra note  7.
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state, denying any conception of an autonomous  public interest in-
dependent  of the sum of individual interests.
Republicanism  stood for the primacy of politics and the relative
autonomy  of ideals  of the good life.  It  emphasized  the growth and
development  of human personality in active political life. Republi-
canism  proceeded from  an objective conception of the public inter-
est and a state that could  legitimately promote  virtue.
The argument becomes  endlessly complex when one attempts to
determine who the liberals and the republicans  were in 1789. Even
Hamilton and Jefferson will not easily fit the liberal or republican
models,  as these  are  only ideal  types.  These models  capture  only
implicit tendencies, which are, at best, immanent in the thought of
any one person.
C.  Understanding  Attacks on the Republican Synthesis
This difficulty is compounded when one seeks to understand the
attacks  from  the left  on  the republican  synthesis  in  the  work  of
Appleby,41 Diggins42  and Kramnick.4s  Two  elements  appear to be
in contention. The first is the relationship between  the republican
conception  and  economic  development.  The  fear  of the  so-called
left liberals  is that the republican  model, by emphasizing the ten-
sion between the civic humanist tradition and commerce,  is in dan-
ger  of descending  into  hopeless  anachronism  and  nostalgia.  Ap-
pleby,  for  example,  quite  astutely  perceives  that  in  America  in
1789,  economic  development  was  desirable  and  virtually  univer-
sally agreed upon. Following Polanyi, Appleby questions whether a
moral  economy  of  development  can  exist  without permitting  an
emerging  market  to  overwhelm  an  autonomous  conception  of
politics.
44
The second point of contention is whether, in effect, the republi-
can vision does not lead  inevitably to authoritarian  conceptions  of
morality.
41.  See J. APPLEBY,  CAPITALISM  AND  A  NEW  SOCIAL  ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN  VISION  OF  THE
1790's (1978); J. APPLEBY, ECONOMIC  THOUGHT  AND  IDEOLOGY  IN SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY  ENG-
LAND  (1978).
42.  See J. DIGGINS,  supra note 7.
43.  See Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 Am.  HIST. REV. 629  (1982).
44. See  sources  cited,  supra note  41;  Thompson,  The  Moral Economy  of the English
Crowd in  the Eighteenth Century, 50  PAST &  PRESENT  76 (1971).
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D.  Fitting  Law into the Debate
How does law fit into this debate? First, the republican synthesis
enables us to see the deeper roots of what previously were deemed
anomalous positions. As Treanor has shown,4 5 for example, the sur-
prising  absence  of just compensation  clauses  in postrevolutionary
state constitutions was based on powerful republican  communitar-
ian  conceptions  of property.
4 6
I would  go  so  far  as  to  argue  that the  fifth  amendment  to the
Constitution represents  a dramatic liberal reversal of the dominant
conception  of the  relationship  between  the  state  and  individual
property  holdings.  The  republican  communitarian  model  in  fact
drew  sustenance  from  the  then  widely  accepted  feudal  common
law view  that all  property  was  held by  the  King.  From this  per-
spective,  indeed,  the  contract  clause  decisions  of  the  Marshall
Court are important in establishing a liberal  conception  of the re-
lationship  between  state and individual. 47
If one reconsiders the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Gibson
of Pennsylvania  in Eakin v.  Raub4 8  opposing judicial  review,  this
opinion  now  can  be  viewed  not  as  some  aberrational  democratic
protest but as part of a more  deeply rooted republican  conception
of government. The same can be said for questions  of separation of
powers and  for such oddities as the  system of legislative  review  of
judgments.  This  practice  was  widespread  in  the  New  England
states  in  1800,  but  was  dismantled  under  judicial  pressure  by
1825.49
Second,  the  republican  synthesis  illuminates  one  of the  richest
issues in American  legal and constitutional history, the  characteri-
zation  of the  public  interest.  The  republican  tradition  promotes
the concept  of an autonomous  public interest, whereas  the liberal
ideal holds that the public  interest is  either simply  procedural  or
45.  See Note, The  Origins and Original  Significance of the Just Compensation Clause,
94  YALE  L.J. 694 (1985)  (authored  by William  M. Treanor).
46.  See id. at 704-08.
47.  See  Trustees  of Dartmouth  College  v.  Woodward,  17  U.S.  (4  Wheat.)  518  (1819);
Sturges  v.  Crowninshield,  17  U.S.  (4  Wheat.)  122  (1819);  Fletcher  v.  Peck,  10  U.S.  (6
Cranch) 87  (1810).
48.  12 Serg.  & Rawle  330,  343-58  (Pa. 1825)  (Gibson,  C.J., dissenting).
49.  E. CORWIN,  COURT OVER  CONSTITUTION: A STUDY  OF  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  AS  AN  INSTRUMENT
OF  POPULAR  GOVERNMENT  13-14  (1938).
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the sum of private interests. This issue runs throughout the  nine-
teenth-century  debates on legal and political theory. In the twenti-
eth  century,  the  issue  is  central  to  understanding  progressivism
and its  impulse  to create  an  administrative-regulatory  state. The
theory of public interest remains quite unexplored  in legal history.
Both the liberal  and the republican traditions  sought to appro-
priate law to their own  visions. As the liberal tradition became  in-
creasingly dominant, proponents of liberalism believed  that a neu-
tral  state  with  neutral  law  could  provide  the  framework  for  a
neutral  market  society.  The  republican  legal  tradition  is  still  in
great  need  of further  elaboration,  despite  Newmyer's  admirable
work  on  Justice  Story"°  and  Gordon's  still  unpublished  Holmes
Lectures  delivered  at Harvard.51 It  is  misleading,  in my  view,  to
identify that tradition  with,  for  example,  the antilegalism  of the
abolitionist  movement.  The  republican  tradition  was  affirmative
about law.
IV.  BROADENING  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  REPUBLICANISM
The next question relates to the sources of American republican-
ism. From Bailyn's Ideological Origins 52 through Wood's The Cre-
ation of the American Republic" 3 and Pocock's Machiavellian  Mo-
ment,5 4  the  sources  of American  republicanism  have  increasingly
been  located  in eighteenth-century  English  oppositionist thought.
The  mixed-government  tradition  of the English  opposition,  with
its heavy emphasis on property, status, and an equilibrium  among
fixed  social  orders,  has  provided  the  foundation  for the  current
dominant interpretation  of republicanism.  Wood, however,  has of-
fered  a basis for interpreting American republicanism as an essen-
tially indigenous  departure  from its conservative  and hierarchical
English  origins.5  He  has  accomplished  this  feat  by  emphasizing
the  almost  instant  irrelevance  of  John Adams'  effort  to  use the
50.  R. NEWMYER,  SUPREME  COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY:  STATESMAN  OF THE OLD  REPUBLIC
(1985).
51.  R.  Gordon,  Lawyers  as  the  American  Aristocracy  (Feb.  19-20,  1985)  (unpublished
Holmes  Lectures at Harvard  Law School).
52.  B. BAILYN,  supra note  7.
53.  G.  WOOD, supra note 7.
54.  See J.G.A.  POCOCK, supra note 7.
55.  G.  WOOD,  supra note 7.
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traditional  ideas  of fixed  ranks  in  a more  socially  fluid  American
environment."
Despite these  strides,  the  current  interpretation  of republican-
ism  seems to be constructed  on  too  narrow  a foundation.  Several
other  important  intellectual  strands  in  early  American  constitu-
tional thought have been badly neglected.
First,  the  Bailyn-Wood  interpretation  has  rendered  American
constitutional  history before the Stamp Act crisis of 1763 virtually
irrelevant  to  an  understanding  of  post-1776  sources  of  constitu-
tionalism. The work of an earlier institutionalist generation  of con-
stitutional  historians  who  traced  American  constitutional  ideas
back to  seventeenth-century  colonial  charters and  codes  has  been
undeservedly  ignored.5 7  The  legalism  of  the  generation  of  1787
owes at least as much to 150 years of colonial constitutional strug-
gles as it does to the constitutional ideas of the English opposition.
Second, the recent emphasis  by writers such as Wills  on the  in-
fluence  of the  Scottish  Enlightenment  is  an  important  develop-
ment in expanding  the sources  of republican  ideas.58 The commu-
nitarian  basis  of  English  republican  thought  is  rooted  in  its
prescriptive  and hierarchial ideas of civil virtue. By contrast, many
of the Scots offered  a more  egalitarian  conception for the basis  of
community.5
A liberal  appropriation of Adam Smith, for example, grossly dis-
torts  his meaning.  Polanyi  sought to  show this  many years  ago.
6 0
More  recently, Wills has suggested the same.61 The recent publica-
tion  of Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence, 62  indeed,  places  him
squarely within the republican tradition of political sociology  from
Montesquieu  to Tocqueville.63
56.  Id.  at 576-87.
57.  See, e.g., P. REINSCH,  ENGLISH  COMMON  LAW  IN THE EARLY  AMERICAN  COLONIES (1970);
Chafee,  Colonial Courts and the Common Law, in ESSAYS  IN  THE HISTORY  OF  EARLY  AMERI-
CAN  LAW  61-78  (D.  Flaherty  ed.  1969);  Goebel, King's Law  and Local Custom in  Seven-
teenth Century New England, 31  COLUM.  L. REv. 416  (1931).
58.  See  G. WILLS,  supra note  30.
59.  Id. at 175-80.
60.  K.  POLANYI,  supra note  29, at 43-45.
61.  See G.  WILLS,  supra note  30.
62.  A. SMITH,  supra note 31.
63.  See supra notes 31-32  and accompanying  text.
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Third, the influence  of French republican thought has been vir-
tually ignored.  The exception to the rule is the mandatory  bow to
Montesquieu's  ideas on separation of powers. This point, however,
usually is followed  by  the required  observation that in  fact Mon-
tesquieu misdescribed  the English constitutional system.
6 4
The  question of influence  requires  much more  study. Why  are
Montesquieu's  institutional  observations  given  such  prominence,
whereas the set of classical  ideas that led him to insist that a free
republic cannot  exist over a large territory is rarely systematically
understood?  As with Adam Smith, Montesquieu's  focus on the so-
cial conditions  necessary  for republican  government has  been en-
tirely  subordinated  to  a  liberal,  institutionalist  interpretation  of
Montesquieu.
This brings  us to Rousseau.  I am convinced that interpretations
of Rousseau  and of his relationship  to Montesquieu have been dis-
torted ever since the French Revolution assigned each his symbolic
role. Only Tocqueville understood that Montesquieu and Rousseau
were  emphasizing  different  aspects  of  one  emergent  republican
tradition.
The  dialectical  character  of Democracy in America 65  must  be
understood  as  Tocqueville's  attempt  to  integrate  his  two  great
forebears.  The Tocquevillian  focus  on  the social  conditions  for  a
"happy Republic,"  moreover, stands in sharp contrast to the mech-
anistic American  liberal emphasis  on  institutional equilibrium.
The influence  of Rousseau  on American  republican thought  ap-
pears  at most to  be  indirect.  This  came  about  in  either  of two
ways. Rousseau might have influenced  English religious dissenters,
who  in  turn  affected,  for  example,  many  Pennsylvania  radical
republicans  after the Revolution.  Alternatively, Rousseau's  philos-
ophy  might  have  appeared  through  the  Jeffersonian  ideal  of the
relatively equal and homogeneous republic of yeoman farmers. The
clearest  link  between  American  and  French  republican  thought,
however,  is found in the single most consistent theme proposed by
64.  See,  e.g.,  Neumann,  Introduction, in  MONTESQUIEU,  SPIRIT  OF  THE  LAWS,  at liii-lv
(1949).
65.  1  TOCQUEVILLE,  DEMOCRACY  IN  AMERICA  (1835);  2  A.  TOCQUEviLLE,  DEMOCRACY  IN
AMERICA  (1840).
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Antifederalist  opposition  to  the Constitution,  the  argument  that
only geographically  small  republics  can maintain  freedom.
This argument has rarely been given its due. The theory was dis-
missed unfairly by the authors of the Federalist  papers  as amount-
ing  to no  more  than  an  argument  against  representative  govern-
ment  and  in  favor  of  wildly  impractical  schemes  of  direct
democracy."'  This was a a preposterous  inference,  considering  the
widespread  acceptance  of representative  systems  in  the  colonies.
Because  of  the  early  dominance  of  national  interpretations  of
American constitutional history, the argument usually is dismissed
as expressing utopian and romantic  objections to the Constitution,
or  else  is  saddled  with  subsequent  proslavery  states'  rights
ideology.
The  argument  for  small  republics  contained  the  essential  ele-
ments  of what today  we would  call the  social  basis  of democratic
society. Whereas the liberal vision severed virtually any connection
between  ideas  of civic  virtue  and the  quality  of government,  this
classical  republican  theme,  espoused  by Montesquieu  and  Rous-
seau, Adam Smith and Tocqueville, underlay the fear of a territori-
ally extensive  government.
The republican theme proposed  two basic ideas. First, only rela-
tive equality  of condition  could promise  the necessary  foundation
for an informed and active  citizenry that would not permit its gov-
ernment either to exploit or dominate one part of the society or to
become  its  instrument.  Second,  only  in  small  societies  could  the
people's representatives remain  in touch with the populace  and its
"middling sort."
The  weight  of history  was  overwhelmingly  on  the  side  of this
analysis.  Liberalism  therefore  had  to  create  a  new  analysis  that
could justify the  possible existence  of freedom  in a large state. In
the process  of creating such a justification, liberalism was forced to
break with the  classical  republican  analysis that  closely identified
the character  of governmental institutions with the structure of so-
cial  conditions.  Liberals  thus  were compelled  ultimately to  break
with the concept  of the virtue  of their citizenry. The  fact that no
American  Tocqueville  ever  appeared  is  directly  related  to  the
power  of  liberal  thought  in  severing  political  sociology  from  an
66.  See G. Woon,  supra note 7,  at 499-500.
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analysis  of the  nature  of governments.  The  French  and Scottish
Enlightenments,  not  eighteenth-century  English  opposition
thought, provided republicans with the categories for analyzing the
connection  between  a  public-spirited  citizenry  and  a  relatively
equal  and active  citizenry.
V.  CONCLUSION:  THE  DICHOTOMY  BETWEEN  NATURAL  LAW  AND
POSITIVISM
The central  focus of law and republicanism  in American  history
ought  to  be  on  the  normative  and  constitutive  character  of law.
Liberalism  regarded  law  as  a  necessary  evil and viewed  it  as the
price  individuals  had to  pay  for  a  reasonable  degree  of security.
The republican  vision, on the  other hand, defined law as constitu-
tive of culture and as potentially positive and emancipatory. Under
the republican view, law could create  structures that enabled  indi-
viduals and  communities  to fulfill their  deepest aspirations.
What  is  so  striking  about  Holmesian  legal  positivism,  as  ex-
pressed in  The Path of the Law,67  is that it  represents, at least at
the  explicit  level,  a  dramatic  reversal  of the  ordinary  normative
conception  of law  that  has  prevailed  through  most  of American
history. The twentieth-century dichotomy between natural law and
positivism  has  confused  our  ability  to  recapture  the  republican
idea of law in American history, for this dichotomy was not incor-
porated  into the  way  nineteenth-century  American  legal  thinkers
experienced  the issue.  For example,  as  Cover  showed  in  his bril-
liant Justice Accused," 8  some antislavery judges  were able to  con-
ceive  of law as  incorporating  normative  ideals.  At the  same  time,
these judges  clearly rejected  any appeal  to higher law  outside the
body  of  legal  principles."  Similarly,  Holmes'  prepositivist  work,
The Common Law,70  shared the widely held view  of his contempo-
raries that the common law was an expression  of custom which it-
self had a normative  and  evolutionary character.
Finally, the attack of progressives  on classical legal thought mis-
leadingly  charged late-nineteenth-century  orthodoxy  with a natu-
67.  Holmes,  The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.  L. REV. 457  (1897).
68.  R. COVER,  JUSTICE ACCUSED:  ANTISLAVERY  AND  THE  JUDICLAL  PROCESS  (1975).
69.  Id.
70.  O.W.  HOLMES,  THE  COMMON  LAW  (1881).
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ral law position. The positivist  position  of many progressives  kept
them  from  appreciating  the  many  normative  elements  built  into
legal categorization and legal reasoning. The famous constitutional
law doctrine of implied limitations is one such example.  These nor-
mative elements were not experienced as importing external higher
law principles  into the  body of law.71
In my view, the stark jurisprudential  dichotomy between natural
law  and positivism  is itself a twentieth-century  positivist creation
that has prevented us from seeing the way in which all legal struc-
tures  inevitably  embody normative  positions.  When  one  creates  a
pyramidal  and  categorical  legal  structure,  as  late-nineteenth-cen-
tury classical  legal thought aspired to do, one  is also committed to
deductive  and formalistic  legal  reasoning  and to conceiving  of all
legal  questions  as,  in  principle,  on-off  questions,  or  questions  of
kind.  By  contrast, when  one  conceives  of legal  phenomena  as  ar-
ranged along a horizontal continuum, as Holmes eventually did, all
legal  questions  become  matters  of  degree, not of  kind. Legal  rea-
soning, consequently,  emphasizes  balancing  tests and tradeoffs.
All legal  systems  have  a legal  architecture  that  categorizes  and
classifies legal phenomena. Every system  of legal  architecture  also
incorporates  deep  into that structure  a set of normative premises
concerning the proper way to talk about law. Whether distinctively
republican  or distinctively  liberal systems of legal architecture  ex-
ist is  a  subject  worthy of future  scholarship.  That  endeavor  will
only be impeded, however,  if we remain  stuck with the formalistic
distinction  between  natural law  and positivism.  We must  become
more  self-conscious  about  legal  historiography  and  the  ways  in
which controversies  over  political  and  legal  theory  influence  legal
historical inquiry. Now  is the time for us  to bridge the chasm be-
tween legal theory and  legal history.
71.  See E. CORWIN,  supra note  17; C.  HAINES,  supra note  17; B.  WRIGHT,  supra note  17;
Corwin,  The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional  Law, 12  MICH. L. REv.  247  (1914).
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